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I.

Introduction

If there is a bedrock principle of the First Amendment, it is that the government cannot
regulate or prohibit the expression of an idea merely because society finds the idea offensive.1 The
Supreme Court has, however, upheld the government regulation of offensive ideas on occasion.2
The latest arena in which the Supreme Court has grappled with such a First Amendment issue is
in the context of trademark registration. Entities ranging from streetwear clothing companies to
California dance-rock bands to multi-national corporations wish to protect their trademarks to
distinguish their goods and to prevent competitors from utilizing their mark.3 Registering a
trademark on the federal trademark register brings with it various benefits, namely constructive
notice, prima facie evidence of the validity of the registered mark, and the incontestability of the
mark after it has been on the register for five years.4 Before applicants can enjoy these benefits,
they have to first clear the hurdles of the Lanham Act. The Lanham Act forbids the registration of
marks that depict or represent “immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter” or marks that
“disparage.”5 In two recent cases, the Supreme Court struck down these provisions.6
In 2017, Simon Tam, the singer in a Californian Asian-American dance-rock group,
applied to the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) to register the group’s name, “The Slants”.7
The PTO refused to grant the registration on the grounds that “slants” is a derogatory, disparaging

*

J.D. Candidate, 2021, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A. 2016, New York University. I would like to
express my gratitude to my faculty advisor, Thomas Healy, for his guidance and support in the writing of this
Comment.
1
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
2
See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U. S. 675 (1986).
3
Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017).
4
Id. at 1753.
5
15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2019).
6
See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017); Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294 (2019).
7
Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1751.

2

term for people of Asian descent.8 The band members argued that while the term is a racial slur,
by naming their band “The Slants” they were reclaiming the word and “drain[ing] its denigrating
force.”9 Through a four Justice opinion and a four Justice concurrence, the Supreme Court
overturned the PTO’s ruling and held that the disparagement standard of the Lanham Act was
unconstitutional. All Justices, while disagreeing about the analytical framework of the case,
agreed on two things: (1) if a trademark regulation is viewpoint-based, it is presumptively
unconstitutional, and (2) the disparagement bar is viewpoint-based.10
In 2019, the Supreme Court evaluated the Lanham Act’s immoral and scandalous standard
in Iancu v. Brunetti.11 Erik Brunetti is an artist and the owner of a clothing line that uses the
trademark “FUCT.”12 The PTO refused to register FUCT to the trademark register, describing the
mark as “highly offensive” and “vulgar” and concluding that it has “negative sexual
connotations.”13 A majority of the Court, looking at “immoral and scandalous” as a single standard
rather than considering the two words as distinct standards,14 overturned the PTO’s decision and
found that the immoral and scandalous bar was viewpoint-based.15
While Iancu v. Brunetti was a personal victory for Erik Brunetti, it is yet unclear how
exactly trademark law will develop as a result of the decision. Many legal commentators are now
speculating that the Supreme Court has handed off the question to Congress. The opinion
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contained both subtle and explicit hints that Congress could rewrite the Lanham Act.16
Unfortunately, the Court has not given Congress a clear guideline. An eight-Justice Court agreed
that the disparagement clause violated the First Amendment, but the opinion left many open
questions regarding how to analyze Lanham Act First Amendment issues.17 In Brunetti, the
majority opinion did not rule on whether trademark registration represented a government subsidy,
a limited public forum, or government speech.18 Additionally, the government and Justice
Sotomayor’s dissent in particular argued that the immoral and scandalous standard should not be
considered a unitary standard, but rather as two distinct standards.19 They suggest that the Lanham
Act could be saved by narrowing the definition of “scandalous.”20 Such a narrower standard would
regulate marks merely because of their “mode of expression” rather than viewpoint, resulting in
viewpoint neutral regulation.21
This Comment will attempt to determine whether a distinction between viewpoint and
mode of expression is viable, and whether it sufficiently narrows the Lanham Act to cure its
constitutional deficiencies. Part II will set out in greater detail trademark law and the trademark
registration process. Part III will review the Matal v. Tam and Iancu v. Brunetti decisions, focusing
on the various Justices’ reasonings. Part IV will consider the Supreme Court’s precedent in regard
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to distinguishing mode of expression from viewpoint, focusing on whether the Court recognizes
mode of expression as a distinct component of speech. This Part highlights the fact that the Court
has not fully accepted mode of expression as a distinct component of speech and has not treated
mode of expression in a consistent manner. Part V will look at communication theory to determine
whether mode of expression can be separated from viewpoint and message, and, if it can, whether
regulating the mode of expression is viewpoint neutral. This Part suggests that mode of expression
likely cannot be separated from the message or the viewpoint of the speaker. Even if it could,
regulating mode of expression inevitably regulates viewpoint.

Part VI will conclude that

narrowing the Lanham Act’s “scandalous” provision to merely cover modes of expression would
not result in viewpoint neutrality.
II.

Trademarks and Federal Registration

Trademarks were not established by federal law and historically were under the purview
of the states.22 The key idea behind trademarks and trademark protection is that recognizable
marks, such as “words, names, symbols, and the like,” help distinguish a business’s goods from
the goods of another business and allow consumers to distinguish and purchase the goods they
want.23 The federal government began to regulate trademarks in the 1870’s, but the foundation of
modern federal trademark law was the Lanham Act of 1946.24 By the time the federal government
became involved, the nature of trademarks had changed. By the 20th century, trademarks “had
expanded far beyond phrases” that simply identified a good.25

Modern trademarks often

“consisted of catchy phrases that convey a message.”26
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The Lanham Act allowed trademarks to be filed on a “principal register,” a federal register
of trademarks, with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”).27 Filing a trademark
registration with the PTO involves paying a fee, filing an application, and filing a verified
statement.28 The application needs to include the applicant’s domicile and citizenship, the date of
the first use of the mark, the date of the first use of the mark in commerce, the goods connected to
that mark, and a drawing of the mark.29 If the mark meets all of the above requirements,
registration is mandatory unless the mark falls into the Lanham Act’s other statutory provisions.30
The statutory provision relevant to this Comment sets out that the PTO cannot register a
trademark that “comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or matter which may
disparage . . . persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into
contempt, or disrepute.”31 This Comment will be focusing on trademarks that fall into the
“immoral and scandalous” or “disparaging” category.
In evaluating whether a trademark violates the disparagement clause, the PTO examiner
applies a two-part test.32 The examiner first considers “the likely meaning of the matter in
question, taking into account not only dictionary definitions, but also the relationship of the matter
to the other elements in the mark, the nature of the goods or services, and the manner in which the
mark is used in the marketplace.”33 If the PTO examiner finds that the meaning refers to
“identifiable persons, institutions, beliefs or national symbols,” the examiner moves to the second
step, which is determining “whether that meaning may be disparaging to a substantial composite

27
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of the referenced group.”34 If the examiner finds that a “substantial composite . . . of the referenced
group would find the proposed mark . . . to be disparaging in the context of contemporary
attitudes,” there is a prima facie violation of the disparagement clause, and the burden shifts to the
applicant to prove that the trademark is not disparaging.35
For the immoral and scandalous clause of the Lanham Act, the PTO applies the bar as a
“unitary provision,” rather than treating the two adjectives separately.36 To determine whether a
mark fits into the category, the PTO asks whether a “substantial composite of the general public”
would find the mark “shocking to the sense of truth, decency, or propriety”; “giving offense to the
conscience or moral feelings”; “calling out for condemnation”; “disgraceful”; “offensive”;
“disreputable”; or “vulgar.”37 If so, then the PTO may refuse to register the mark due to the
“immoral and scandalous” standard in the Lanham Act.
It is important to note that registration of a trademark is not necessary for the trademark to
be enforceable in court.38 A valid, unregistered trademark can still be used in commerce,39 and a
trademark is also enforceable under state law.40 That said, federal registration imparts “important
legal rights and benefits on trademark owners who register their marks.”41 Registration on the
principal, federal register (1) “serves as ‘constructive notice of the registrant’s claim of ownership’
of the mark”;42 (2) “is ‘prima facie evidence of the validity of the registered mark and of the
registration of the mark, of the owner’s ownership of the mark, and of the owner’s exclusive right
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to use the registered mark in commerce . . ..’”;43 and (3) can make a mark “‘incontestable’” once
a mark has been registered for five years.44 Registration also allows the trademark holder “to stop
the importation into the United States of articles bearing an infringing mark.”45 While registration
is not necessary to enjoy the benefits of a valid trademark, registering a trademark with the federal
register imparts various benefits on the trademark holder. Today, there are over two million
federally registered trademarks.46
III.

The Supreme Court’s Invalidation of the Disparagement Clause and the
“Scandalous and Immoral” Clause

The Court invalidated the disparagement clause in the 2017 case, Matal v. Tam. Matal v.
Tam concerned a trademark registration application for a California band called “The Slants.”47
Simon Tam is the singer of the Asian-American dance-rock group, who stated that he chose the
name to “reclaim” and “take ownership” of Asian stereotypes.48 The PTO denied the application
based on the disparagement clause in the Lanham Act,49 basing its decision on the finding that “the
band’s name has been found offensive numerous times.”50 The PTO pointed to a cancelled
performance by the band and several bloggers and commentators who had been offended by the
band’s name.51 Tam appealed the PTO’s decision in federal court.52 The Federal Circuit
overturned the PTO’s decision, holding that the disparagement clause is facially unconstitutional
under the First Amendment Free Speech Clause.53 The majority found that the clause was a
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Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (2019)).
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viewpoint-based regulation of the expressive component of trademarks.54 It also found that
trademarks were not commercial speech.55 The Government appealed the decision to the Supreme
Court.56
The key issue in Matal was whether the disparagement clause violates the First
Amendment.

Justice Alito addressed the government’s arguments that: (1) trademarks are

government speech, not private speech; (2) trademarks are a form of government subsidy; and (3)
the constitutionality of the disparagement clause should be tested under a new “governmentprogram” doctrine.57
Justice Alito quickly dismissed the idea that trademarks are a form of government speech.
He compared Matal to Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., in which the
Court held that Texas specialty license plates were government speech.58 The Walker Court rested
its decision on three factors.59 First, the Court found that license plates convey state messages.60
Second, license plates “are often closely identified in the public mind” with the State, since they
are manufactured and owned by the State, generally designed by the State, and serve as a form of
“government ID.”61 Third, Texas “maintain[ed] direct control over the messages conveyed on its
specialty plates.”62 None of these factors apply to trademark registration. Additionally, Justice
Alito noted that if trademark registration is in fact government speech then “the Federal
Government is babbling prodigiously and incoherently.”63 The government would be endorsing a

54

Id. at 1754.
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vast variety of products and saying contradicting things.64 Justice Alito thus held that trademarks
are private, not government speech.65
Justice Alito also quickly dismissed the idea that trademarks are government subsidies. He
concluded that trademarks are not subsidies because the government is not giving out “cash
subsidies or their equivalent.”66 Even though in past cases the Court has considered tax benefits
as subsidies, he held that the federal trademark registration program is nothing like a government
subsidy program.67 The PTO does not pay money to parties seeking registration of a mark. On
the contrary, an applicant for registration must pay the PTO a filing fee of $225-$600.68 To
maintain federal registration, the holder of a mark must also pay a fee of $300-$500 every 10
years.69 Furthermore, Justice Alito stipulated that numerous government registration schemes
exist, such as for motor vehicles and fishing permits, and merely because there is an incidental
benefit in registering something, it cannot be said that the government is subsidizing it.70 Justice
Alito thus found that trademark registration was not a government subsidy program.
Finally, Justice Alito considered whether trademark registration creates a “government
program.” He found that the “government program” doctrine merges the subsidy and government
speech arguments into one and constructs a broader doctrine that could possibly cover
trademarks.71 The Court refused to extend the government program doctrine to cover trademark
registration, as the government program doctrine cases “occupy a special area of First Amendment
case law” and are “far removed” from the realm of trademarks.72 Justice Alito then considered

64

Id.
Id. at 1760.
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Id. at 1761.
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whether the federal trademark register is a public forum.73 When the government creates a public
forum, in either a literal or “metaphysical” sense, some content- and speaker-based restrictions
may be permissible.74 Even in such cases, “viewpoint discrimination” is not permissible.75 Justice
Alito thus turned to whether the disparagement standard constituted viewpoint discrimination. He
found that it did. Justice Alito noted that because the PTO denied registration to any mark that is
offensive to a substantial percentage of the members of any group, it is viewpoint discrimination.76
He concluded that “giving offense is a viewpoint,” and invalidated the disparagement clause.77
All Justices agreed that trademarks are not government speech, and that the disparagement
clause is viewpoint-based and therefore in violation of the First Amendment.78 Justice Kennedy,
joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, wrote the four-Justice concurrence. He
quickly concluded that the disparagement clause was viewpoint discrimination, because it allowed
an applicant to register a “positive or benign mark” but not a “derogatory” one.79 Justice Kennedy
then addressed the government’s arguments, beginning with the assertion that the law was
viewpoint neutral because it applied to any trademark that demeans or offends.80

Citing

Rosenberger, Justice Kennedy concluded that preventing all sides from criticizing their opponents
makes a law more viewpoint-based, not viewpoint neutral.81 By requiring that a trademark be
positive and non-derogatory the law “might silence dissent and distort the marketplace of ideas.”82

73

Id. at 1763.
See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830–31 (1995).
75
Id. at 831.
76
Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1763.
77
Id.
78
See Matal, 137 S. Ct.
79
Id. at 1766.
80
Id.
81
Id. (citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831–832 (1995) (“The . . . declaration
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ways”)).
82
Id.
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Justice Kennedy saw the requirement of viewpoint neutrality as more than simply protecting the
“right to identify with a particular side,” but rather as guaranteeing a right to “create and present
arguments” for various positions in ways the speaker chooses.83
Justice Kennedy then addressed the government’s next argument, that the law was
viewpoint neutral because registration was denied based on the expected reaction of the audience,
not the applicant’s personal views.84 Justice Kennedy concludes that a law does not become
viewpoint neutral merely because the censorship is tied to the reaction of the audience.85 The
danger of viewpoint discrimination is the government attempting to remove certain ideas from the
broader public debate, and that danger is exacerbated if those ideas are offensive.86 An offensive
idea can lead to reflection and more debate, resulting in a “more reasoned, more tolerant”
position.87 Additionally, Justice Kennedy found that ultimately, when it comes to Lanham Act
issues, it was the PTO deciding which ideas led to the audience taking offense.88 As such, it is
difficult to remove the government’s own opinion from the PTO’s decisions.89
Yet, unlike Justice Alito, Justice Kennedy did not reach the questions of whether trademark
registration is a government subsidy or a public forum.90 The Court’s unclear position on such
questions, along with Justice Alito’s, Justice Breyer’s, Chief Justice Robert’s, and Justice
Thomas’s opposition to considering trademark registration a government subsidy or a public
forum, played a key role in the Iancu v. Brunetti decision two terms after Matal.
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In Iancu v. Brunetti, Erik Brunetti, an artist and founder of the “FUCT” clothing line,
attempted to register the “FUCT” trademark. The PTO did not grant registration, and a PTO
attorney described the mark as “vulgar” and “unregistrable.”91 The PTO officer further thought
that the mark communicated “misogyny, depravity, [and] violence,” and concluded that “whether
one considers [the mark] as a sexual term, or finds that [Brunetti] has used [the mark] in the context
of extreme misogyny, nihilism or violence, [it has] no question but that [the term is] extremely
offensive.”92 The PTO thus found the mark unregistrable based on the “immoral and scandalous”
clause of the Lanham Act.

Brunetti then brought a facial challenge to the “immoral and

scandalous” clause to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.93 The appellate court found
the “immoral and scandalous” clause to violate the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause.94
The issue for the Supreme Court was whether denying a trademark registration because the
mark is “immoral and scandalous” is a violation of the First Amendment. The majority began by
clarifying that because the PTO applies “immoral and scandalous” as one standard, it too would
consider the two words as one standard.95 Writing for the majority, Justice Kagan found that based
on the dictionary definitions of immoral “the Lanham Act permits registration of marks that
champion society’s sense of rectitude and morality, but not marks that denigrate those concepts.”96
Based on the dictionary definitions of scandalous “the Lanham Act allows registration of marks
when their messages accord with, but not when their messages defy, society’s sense of decency or
propriety.”97 Put together, Justice Kagan concluded that the definitions meant that the Lanham
Act allows the registration of trademarks when society in general approves of them from a moral

91

Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2298 (2019).
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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or decency viewpoint, but does not allow registration when society would condemn the
viewpoint.98 The law has a facial viewpoint bias which “results in viewpoint-discriminatory
application.”99
The Government argued that the statute can be narrowed to “marks that are offensive [or]
shocking to a substantial segment of the public because of their mode of expression, independent
of any views that they may express.”100 The Government explained that such an interpretation
would limit the Lanham Act to marks that are “vulgar”—meaning “lewd,” “sexually explicit or
profane.”101 Such a regulation, according to the Government, would not turn on viewpoint and the
PTO could enforce it.102 The majority did not rule on whether the government’s narrowing
construction would solve the First Amendment issues because it stated that the narrow
interpretation was not supported by the text of the statute in its current form.103
Several Justices alluded to or explicitly supported Congress revising the text of the statute.
Justice Alito in his concurrence made clear that “[the Supreme Court’s] decision did not prevent
Congress from adopting a more carefully focused statute that precludes the registration of marks
containing vulgar terms that play no real part in the expression of ideas.”104 Chief Justice Roberts
seemed to agree with the government’s interpretation of “scandalous.” Concurring in part and
dissenting in part, he agreed with the majority’s analysis of the “immoral” clause but thought that
“scandalous” was separable from immoral.105 He argued that the term “scandalous” does not need
to be understood as reaching marks that offend because of the ideas they convey; “it can be read

98
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100
Id. at 2301.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2301.
104
Id.
105
Id.
99

14

more narrowly to bar only marks that offend because of their mode of expression—marks that are
obscene, vulgar, or profane.”106 Justice Breyer, pointing to Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence and
dissent, agreed that the Court should interpret the word “scandalous” in the statute to refer only to
highly “vulgar” or “obscene” modes of expression.107
Justice Sotomayor offered the most comprehensive analysis of how the Government’s
argument—narrowing the Lanham Act along the “scandalous” standard—could be effectuated.
Justice Sotomayor argued that it is “possible to read that provision’s bar on the registration of
‘scandalous’ marks to address only obscenity, vulgarity, and profanity.”108 Offensiveness could
result from the views expressed, but it could also result from the way in which those views are
expressed: using a manner of expression that is “shocking to [one’s] sense of . . . decency” or
“extremely offensive to the sense of . . . propriety.”109 She concluded that the word “scandalous”
on its own is ambiguous.110 It can be read broadly (to cover both offensive ideas and offensive
manners of expressing ideas), or it can be read narrowly (to cover only offensive modes of
expression).”111

Justice Sotomayor concluded that because Congress would not have put

duplicative or unnecessary words into a statute, Congress must have intended “scandalous” to be
distinct from “immoral.”112 Thus, while “immoral” and “disparaging” cover marks that are
offensive because of the ideas they express, “scandalous” covers marks that are offensive because
of their mode of expression, separate from a message or viewpoint.113

106

Id. at 2303.
Id. at 2304.
108
Id. at 2308.
109
Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2309.
110
Id.
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In that sense, the “scandalous” standard could be used to regulate marks that are expressed
in a shocking or offensive manner, such as when the speaker employs obscenity, vulgarity, or
profanity.114 Obscenity has been defined by the Court numerous times.115 As for vulgarity and
profanity, Justice Sotomayor did not precisely define those terms. She stated that she “interpret[s]
the term to allow the PTO to restrict . . . the small group of lewd words or ‘swear’ words that cause
a visceral reaction, that are not commonly used around children, and that are prohibited in
comparable settings.”116

Justice Sotomayor argues that when narrowed, “scandalous” is a

viewpoint-neutral form of content discrimination that is permissible in the kind of discretionary
governmental program or limited forum typified by the trademark-registration system.117
IV.

Supreme Court Precedent

It is unlikely that “scandalous” could be sufficiently narrowed by redefining the term as
regulating mode of expression rather than viewpoint. As it stands, the Court does not have a
comprehensive method of dealing with mode of expression or distinguishing modes of expression
from message or viewpoint.118 The Court has occasionally made the distinction, but it has
inconsistently applied the law to that distinction.
A. Justice Sotomayor has not sufficiently distinguished Cohen v. California
The natural starting point is the landmark case of Cohen v. California, which presents a
somewhat similar situation to Iancu v. Brunetti. During the Vietnam War, the defendant, Cohen,
entered a courthouse with the words “Fuck the Draft” prominently displayed on the back of his
jacket.119 The defendant was convicted in Municipal Court of violating a part of a California

114

Id. at 2311.
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statute that prohibits “’maliciously and willfully disturb[ing] the peace or quiet of any
neighborhood or person . . . by . . . offensive conduct . . ..’”120 The defendant testified in court that
he wore the jacket as a means of informing the public of the depth of his feelings against the
Vietnam War and the draft.121 The Court of Appeals affirmed and the California Supreme Court
declined review.122 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.123
The Court made clear in Cohen that the fact that unwilling onlookers may be present to see
Cohen’s “distasteful mode of expression,” does not serve automatically to justify curtailing all
speech capable of giving offense.”124 The Court noted that the government’s prerogative to shut
down “discourse solely to protect others from hearing it” depends on “a showing that substantial
privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner.”125 Otherwise, a majority
could simply silence dissidents “as a matter of personal predilections.”126 The Court then framed
the issue as whether California can label Cohen’s actions as “offensive conduct” and remove a
phrase from the public discourse on either the theory that it is likely to cause a violent reaction or
on the theory that the States can act as “guardians of public morality” and remove words from the
public vocabulary.127
The Court dismissed the violent reaction theory quickly, by stating that the government did
not present any evidence showing that sections of the public were prepared and willing to strike
out against an person’s use of a curse word.128 The Court then dismissed the public morality theory
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on several grounds.129 First, the Court stated that “one man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric.”130 It is
hard to draw lines as to what kind of language is vulgar and what kind of language is not. Second,
the Court stated that the state “has no right to cleanse public debate to the point where it is
grammatically palatable to the most squeamish among us.”131 It is difficult for government
officials to make decisions in this area, which is why the Constitution left it to the individual.132
Finally, the Court argued that “much linguistic expression serves a dual communicative
function.”133 Part of communication consists of only ideas which are capable of being separated
from the mode of expression, but a part of communication also expresses “otherwise inexpressible
emotions.”134
Brunetti cited Cohen to argue that the restriction at issue in Iancu v. Brunetti was viewpoint
discrimination. But Justice Sotomayor argued that Cohen did not reach as far as Brunetti claimed
it did.135 She attempted to distinguish Cohen by arguing that the Court did not suggest that the
State had targeted Cohen to suppress his specific, anti-war viewpoint, such that it would have
accepted a similarly vulgar statement in support of the draft.136 Rather, Justice Sotomayor
suggested that the State had simply engaged in what later courts would call viewpoint-neutral
content discrimination—it had regulated “the form or content of individual expression.”137 Justice
Sotomayor further argued that the Cohen Court’s language, stating that words are chosen for their
literal meaning as well as their emotive meaning, is consistent with observing that a plain, blanket
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restriction on profanity is a viewpoint-neutral form of content discrimination.138

Cohen’s

discussion did not go further to say that a regulation that treats all instances of profanity equally is
nevertheless by nature an instance of “the government target[ing] . . . particular views taken by
speakers on a subject.”139 According to Justice Sotomayor, Cohen therefore did not resolve this
case in Brunetti’s favor. While Brunetti, much like Cohen, was subject to content discrimination,
that discrimination was a viewpoint neutral regulation of Brunetti’s mode of expression.
Yet, Justice Sotomayor does not address all of the Cohen Court’s reasoning. Her argument
is a viable one if the mode of expression can truly be separated from the viewpoint. The Cohen
Court was keenly aware of how the regulation of specific, offensive words could affect viewpoint,
albeit without ever using the term “viewpoint”.140 In concluding his majority opinion Justice
Harlan stated that the Court “cannot indulge the facile assumption that one can forbid particular
words without also running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process.”141 He continued
by noting that the government might “seize upon the censorship of particular words” to ban the
“expression of unpopular views.”142 The Court in Cohen explicitly stated that even if it considered
offensive words as modes of expression, it is dubious that prohibiting words would not also run
the risk of limiting viewpoints.
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The Court in Cohen was also aware the value profanity and offensiveness have in emotive
speech and expressing emotion. It expressly stated that vulgarity, used as a tool to express
emotion, directly affects the speaker’s message.143 Justice Harlan stated that the Court cannot
“sanction” the view that the Constitution, while “solicitous of the cognitive content of individual
speech,” ceases to care about the “emotive function which, practically speaking, may often be the
more important element of the overall message. . ..”144 While Cohen did not go on to state that the
government cleansing the public discourse of profanity is viewpoint-based discrimination, it was
aware that regulating the use of certain words can have that effect.
It is also important to remember that the Court in Cohen did not need to reach the question
of whether offensiveness constitutes a viewpoint. The fact that the California law was a contentbased regulation of speech was enough for the Cohen Court to apply heightened scrutiny in the
criminal context.145 Thus, Justice Sotomayor’s assertion that the Cohen Court did not discuss
whether the state law was viewpoint discriminatory is accurate. That is not the same, however, as
concluding that the Court said that the law was viewpoint neutral. The state law in Cohen may
well have been viewpoint discriminatory, but the Cohen Court did not need to reach the issue of
viewpoint to apply heightened scrutiny. Moreover, in light of Matal v. Tam, it is likely that the
state law in Cohen was viewpoint discriminatory. Justice Alito concluded his opinion with the
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phrase: “giving offense is a viewpoint.”146 Justice Kennedy, in an opinion joined by Justice
Sotomayor a mere two terms before Iancu v. Brunetti, invalidated Justice Sotomayor’s argument
in Brunetti. He found that merely because a law limited and regulated speech on all sides did not
make it viewpoint neutral, but rather more viewpoint-based.147 Regardless whether decided
through Justice Alito’s or Justice Kennedy’s framework from Matal, Cohen would likely be
considered viewpoint discriminatory today.
B. The Supreme Court is inconsistent with how it treats modes of expression
Looking beyond Cohen v. California, the Supreme Court’s precedent when it comes to
modes of expression and their effect on viewpoint is inconclusive. Professor Alan Howard argues
in his article that for the Supreme Court the crucial issue with distinguishing mode of expression
from content and viewpoint began in 1986 with City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.148 In
Renton, the Court rejected a First Amendment challenge to a zoning ordinance that prohibited
adult motion picture theaters from being within 1,000 feet of a residential zone, single or
multifamily dwelling, church, park, or school.149 Based on the definitions, the ordinance was
content-based on the basis of subject matter, as it applied only to sexual content. The Court
nevertheless treated the law as content-neutral, because it was motivated by a decision to control
the secondary effects of adult theaters and not by a motivation to restrict speech.150 According to
Professor Howard, Renton broke the classic content-based/content-neutral dichotomy the Court
traditionally used and “over the years has produced a panoply of confusing and often incoherent

146

Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1763 (2017).
Id. at 1766.
148
Howard, supra note 118, at 52.
149
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986).
150
Id.
147

21

analyses.”151 He argued that this case is really the beginning of several Supreme Court cases that
upheld a statute based on its regulation of a mode of expression.152
The Court has held many times that certain modes of expression can be proscribed by the
government without violating First Amendment law. Justice Sotomayor’s argument attempts to
equate obscenity, vulgarity, or profanity with those proscribed modes of expression. The question
is thus whether mode of expression is separable from viewpoint, and, if it is, whether regulating
modes of expression affects viewpoint.
i.

Obscenity is outside the scope of the First Amendment and likely does not
sufficiently narrow the “scandalous” standard

First, while Justice Sotomayor lists obscenity alongside vulgarity and profanity, obscenity
is distinct from the other terms. The Court often describes obscenity as being outside of the First
Amendment protected speech altogether.153 Obscenity is defined narrowly by the Court. When a
court must decide whether a proscribed form of communication is obscenity the basic guidelines
for the trier of fact are (a) whether “the average person, applying contemporary community
standards” would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether
the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by
the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value.154
Justice Sotomayor is correct that government can proscribe obscene language and obscene
modes of expression, but a trademark like Brunetti’s, for example, would certainly not meet the
standard described in Miller v. California. The trademark in Matal v. Tam would not meet the
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obscenity standard because it is not sexual in nature. As such, narrowing “scandalous” to mean
obscene modes of expression is under-inclusive for Justice Sotomayor’s purposes. In order to
sufficiently narrow “scandalous,” profanity and vulgarity must be considered as modes of
expression independent from viewpoint.
ii.

The Supreme Court’s treatment of profanity and vulgarity has been
inconsistent and inconclusive

The Court has been inconsistent in its case law both as to whether profanity and vulgarity
are modes of expression and as to whether the government may regulate profanity and vulgarity.
Cohen sets forth several arguments as to why profanity and vulgarity are important aspects of
viewpoint and should not be considered mere modes of expression. While FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation has contradicted Cohen on some grounds, the Court has not regularly applied the
reasoning from Pacifica Foundation to other cases and the reasoning seems to be limited to the
context of the broadcast medium. Since Pacifica Foundation, the Court has not articulated a
definite stance on modes of expression and their regulation.
In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, the Court upheld the ability of the Federal
Communications Commission to prohibit and punish indecent language over television and
radio.155 The case arose out of a radio station in New York playing comedian George Carlin’s
monologue on the “seven dirty words.”156 The Court held that while the government could not
prohibit these words, it could ban them from being aired over the broadcast media, stating that
“patently offensive, indecent material presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only
in public, but also in the privacy of the home, where the individual’s right to be left alone plainly
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outweighs the First Amendment rights of an intruder.”157 The Court weighed in favor of regulation
because broadcasting is accessible to children, “even those too young to read.”158 Justice Harlan,
writing for the majority, expressly stated that if the government’s regulation of Carlin’s offensive
monologue “could be traced to its political content . . . First Amendment protection might be
required.”159 In his opinion, Justice Harlan thus drew a distinction between the message and the
mode of expression, namely the use of profanity and vulgarity, but still left open the possibility
that First Amendment protections could apply if the regulation were tied to viewpoint.
At first glance, the Pacifica Foundation decision seems to support Justice Sotomayor’s
position that vulgarity and profanity are modes of expression. The Pacifica Foundation decision
seems to be at odds with Cohen. For one, it suggests that the Court can cleanse the broadcast
media in order to make it safe for children, something that Cohen expressly rejected in the public
realm. Justice Harlan even seemed to distinguish between mode of expression and content; Cohen
v. California cast doubts on such distinctions. The case also suggests that Cohen may not be set
in stone. Pointing to Pacifica Foundation, Justice Sotomayor may say that while her reasoning
seems to contradict the Court’s dicta from Cohen, the Court has also contradicted Cohen in the
past. The fact that the Court appeared to distinguish Cohen in Pacifica Foundation can thus lend
credence to Justice Sotomayor’s treatment of Cohen.
Unfortunately for Justice Sotomayor, the Court seems reluctant to expand Pacifica
Foundation, as it has not been willing to extend it beyond the free radio broadcast medium. For
example, in Sable Communications v. FCC, the Court held that it is unconstitutional for a federal
statute, designed to eliminate the “dial-a-porn” industry, to prohibit indecent speech.160 The Court
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rested its decision on a lack of a “captive audience” as callers were generally willing listeners.161
Additionally, in United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. the Court used strict scrutiny
to declare unconstitutional a provision of the Cable Act regulating sexual speech.162 The Cable
Act intended to limit the broadcast of sexually explicit channels to certain hours in order to prevent
signal bleed—a situation where people receive images from cable channels to which they do not
subscribe.163 The Court held that the law was content-based discrimination as it applied only to
non-obscene sexual images, but not to any other type of images.164 The law did not survive strict
scrutiny, because there were other less restrictive measures the government could have
employed.165

Given that the Court was unwilling to extend Pacifica’s reasoning to cable

television, it is unlikely that the Court would extend Pacifica to trademark registration.
Nevertheless, Pacifica appears to set out a distinction between viewpoint and mode of expression
when it comes to profanity and vulgarity.
Since Pacifica Foundation, Justice Stevens seemed to have been a proponent of separating
mode of expression from content or viewpoint. In his concurrence in Consolidated Edison Co. v.
Public Service Commission of New York, Justice Stevens argued that there are two types of
offensiveness: offensiveness independent of the message of the speaker, and offensiveness because
the listener disagrees with the speaker.166 He argued that offensiveness of form, or mode of
expression, can be appropriate for regulation.167 In Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp. the
majority struck down a federal statute that prohibited sending unsolicited advertisements for
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contraceptives through the mail.168 Justice Stevens noted in his concurrence that he agreed with
the majority because the law regulates “communications for their ideas or for their style.” He
stated, however that “regulations of form and context may strike a constitutionally appropriate
balance” between the speaker’s right to express a message and a listener’s interest in “the quality
of his environment.”169 Justice Stevens seemed to be drawing a distinction between mode of
expression and ideas or content, and asserting that in some instances limiting a speaker’s freedom
of expression can be appropriate.
At the same time, there are several examples of Justices advocating that mode of expression
cannot be separated from the viewpoint or the message. Justice Harlan’s opinion in Cohen is one
example. Another is Justice Brennan’s dissent in Pacifica, where he stated that the idea that the
message is separable from the “vehicle for its expression” is “transparently fallacious.”170 Justice
O'Connor in her opinion for the Court in City of Erie v. Pap's A.M. stated that there may be cases
where “banning the means of expression so interferes with the message that it essentially bans the
message.”171 These Justices suggest that the mode of expression is sufficiently linked to the
message or viewpoint that regulating one will affect the other.
In short, the Supreme Court has not applied the distinction between mode of expression
and the viewpoint of the speaker “in a proper and systematic manner.”172 The Court is unclear as
to whether mode of expression can be separated from the content or the message. If it can, the
Court is further unclear on how modes of expression ought to be treated. Over the years, the
Justices have either not touched on the issue, or have had diverging opinions. On the current Court,
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the notion that mode of expression can be separated from the content or the message seems to have
support from Justices Sotomayor, Breyer, Roberts, and Alito. The other Justices did not discuss
the issue in Iancu v. Brunetti. It appears to be an open question.
V.

Lessons from Communication Theory

Professor Howard, while arguing that mode of expression can be separated from the
content and ideas, stated that “some modes of expression may be so intertwined with the particular
message” that “requiring the speaker to alter his mode of expression runs the risk of altering the
message itself.”173 He considers the example of Picasso’s painting, Guernica.174 He admits that
it is “hard to conceive of separating the mode of the expression from the message” of Guernica.175
At the same time, however, he suggests that “it is conceivable that one could articulate in words
the gist of what Picasso intended to communicate about the Spanish Civil War when he painted
Guernica.”176 Communication theory seems to suggest, however, that any attempt at describing
what Picasso communicated through Guernica in words would be vastly under-inclusive. A
painting says more than a paragraph of words. Furthermore, even if one could find words to fully
describe Guernica, the medium used would inevitably affect the way people view it. For example,
a glance at Guernica the painting would give a larger sense of what Picasso was trying to
communicate than a glance at Guernica the book. Given the dearth of consistent Supreme Court
precedent, the question that needs answering is whether changing or regulating the modes of
expression affects the message or viewpoint of the speaker.
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Marshall McLuhan’s seminal book, The Medium is the Massage, argues that the medium
is more important in communication than the message itself.177 While heavily focused on how
communications media were influenced by emerging technologies, McLuhan argues that
“[s]ocieties have always been shaped more by the nature of the media by which men communicate
than by the content of the communication.”178 McLuhan’s starting point is that all media are an
extension of a human faculty.179 As such, media evoke “unique ratios of sense perception,” such
that the extension of “one sense alters the way we think and act.”180 Illustrating his point with the
example of the alphabet and the printing press, he argues that prior to those technologies the key
human faculty and the “dominant organ of sensory and social orientation” was the ear.181 In those
times, people lived in an “acoustic space” where speech was the main source of information.182
Then came the alphabet and the printing press. Both fundamentally changed the way
societies think by fostering “a process of specialism and of detachment.”183 The two technologies
created “the portable book” which could be read in privacy and isolation.184 Literacy enabled
people to have the “power of detachment” and “non-involvement.”185 By its very structure the
alphabet—a “construct of fragmented bits and parts which have no semantic meaning in
themselves”—forced people to think linearly and be dependent on the “presentation of connected
and sequential facts or concepts.”186
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Electronic circuitry profoundly changed the way society thinks once again. McLuhan
declared that people now live in a “global village . . . a simultaneous happening.”187 Electric
circuitry “involves men with one another.”188 Gone are the days of reading a book or newspaper
in isolation; today “information pours upon us, instantaneously and continuously.”189 McLuhan
argued that people can no longer be limited with linear “block-by-block, step-by-step” thinking,
as instantaneous communication makes sure that “all factors of the environment and of experience
coexist in a state of active interplay.”190 To McLuhan, the idea that the message, idea, or content
of communication can be separated from the medium is an impossibility. The way people think is
firmly linked to the medium of communication and people often do not fully appreciate how the
medium affects the message.
While the “mode of expression” discussed by Justice Sotomayor in Brunetti refers to a
slightly different concept than the “medium” discussed by McLuhan, McLuhan’s principles are
still valid in analyzing Justice Sotomayor’s argument. In the same sense that medium has a
profound effect on communication, the mode of expression has a profound effect on the message
or viewpoint of speech. The key concept from McLuhan’s book is not merely that the medium is
the message, but rather that the medium is often not thought about. People tend not to think about
how they received information but focus on the information itself. This creates an environment
where manipulating the way a certain message is received can change the message itself, and, in
turn, perhaps create a more powerful message. Profanity and vulgarity do not simply amplify a
message, they change it.
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In the context of art, the mode of expression cannot be separated from the content or the
message of an art piece. According to Amy Sabrin, mode of expression comprises the means by
which subject matter and viewpoint are expressed.191 She argues that whether the style or form
enhances or interferes with the viewpoint is “perhaps the most important factor—and often the
most debated one . . ..”192 Sabrin also discusses the role offensiveness plays in artistic endeavors.
Sabrin states that even art that expresses “repulsive” views, such as art that is sexist, racist or
violent, can have “technical,” merit.193 She uses Leni Riefenstahl's pro-Hitler propaganda films
of World War II and some rap music and music videos as examples of works that express repulsive
and offensive views, but have artistic merit.194 The more fundamental problem with disqualifying
offensive viewpoints is that viewpoint is “perhaps the most subjective element of content.”195 It
is precisely the types of work that offend that “may be intentionally or unintentionally complex,
contradictory, or ambiguous.”196 In short, she argues that it is hard to separate the offensiveness
from the message, when offensiveness may be the message or a major component of the message.
Considering McLuhan’s and Sabrin’s works in tandem begins to demonstrate the
difficulties of separating mode of expression and viewpoint. As an example, consider the
California band, The Slants, from Matal v. Tam. While the name refers to a derogatory term, the
band believe that the name will help reclaim the term and “drain its denigrating force.”197
McLuhan would argue that the band chose to express a message in a certain way—through
trademark registration and the use of a racial slur—and the medium chosen is just as important as
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the message itself. Applying McLuhan’s idea of media evoking “ratios of sense perception,”
profanity and the medium of trademark registration offer “The Slants” a mode of expression like
no other. The trademark necessarily means that “The Slants” name will always be associated with
the band,198 and the offensiveness gives the band a wider reach than an inoffensive trademark
could. The fact that bloggers and commentators are engaged in a public discussion about the
band’s name is indicative of that fact. While it is true that there are other ways of “drain[ing] the
denigrating force” from a racial slur, it is also hard to conceive of a way to express exactly what
the band aimed to express by calling themselves “The Slants” through other modes of expression
without sacrificing meaning, message, and viewpoint. Sabrin would similarly argue that the
offensiveness of the name “The Slants” serves a purpose. It is doubtful that regulating the mode
of expression would not also tamper with that purpose.
The use of offensive language serves many functions that help further reinforce the author’s
or speaker’s message and ideas. One example of such a phenomenon is in the context of political
campaigns. An Italian study decided to try to pin down the effects of swearing and vulgar language
on voters during a hypothetical local election.199 A sample of the electorate was split up and given
one of two blog posts by a hypothetical local politician.200 One blog post contained vulgar
language, while the other contained “neutral” language.201 The study found that using vulgar
language in a blog post generally increased the perceived informality of a source and “improved
the impression about the source.”202 Citing Marshall McLuhan, the study found that when “the
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source is the message” and informality is perceived by voters as “a positive surprise,” swearing
and profanity can be a useful method of getting political consensus.203 The study also suggests
that the positive effect of vulgarity seems to apply to the whole electorate.204 The effects “did not
vary as a function of participants’ gender, education, involvement in politics, and self-reported
position on the left–right political spectrum.”205 In the political sphere, profanity and vulgarity
can serve important functions that help define the politician and his or her ideas and viewpoints.
Another example of the effective use of vulgarity is in the television series South Park.
While South Park often employs “lewd toilet humor,” it often addresses important, contemporary
issues.206 Joe Thorogood argues that the two sides of South Park—the serious, political side and
the toilet humor side—actually feed off of each other. He argues that the lewd humor is “a central
and vital technique” that creates a unique sense of satire that does not resemble “conventional
political humor.”207 South Park consistently blends the trashy and lewd with geopolitics and social
commentary.208
Thorogood asserts that the use of profanity to tackle important issues has deep historical
roots, and points to the writings of Mikheal Bakhtin, an early 20th century writer whose writings
employed infantile humor.209 Bakhtin wrote about the concept of “carnival,” a situation where
“frivolity and chaos associated with carnival celebrations invert the normal functioning of
order.”210 He also developed the idea of “body grotesque,” a lowering of what is perceived as high
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culture to the level of the lewd in the form of bodily functions.211 Bakhtin and Thorogood argue
that such methods contained “revolutionary potential,” as in the face of carnival and body
grotesque social hierarchy faded away and was replaced with a sense of equality.212
South Park, according to Thorogood, is a modern continuation of the themes of carnival
and body grotesque. In one notable episode, one of South Park’s main characters attempts to pin
the fault for the September 11, 2001 attacks on one of his classmates.213 This premise leads to an
episode exploring the concepts of 9/11 conspiracy theories.214 In the process, the episode includes
images of a United States president killing a leader of a 9/11 conspiracy organization, a student
defecating in a school bathroom, and images of the Twin Towers in flames with a primary school
student’s face superimposed on the wreckage.215 All of these images can be patently offensive.
Yet, the body grotesque and carnival aspects enhance the episode’s messages and viewpoints,
whatever one might think of them. Through lewd humor South Park explores the United States
government’s fear of geopolitical threats from within its borders, the government’s fragility and
incompetence after 9/11, and the ridiculous nature of conspiracy theories.216 South Park’s creators,
Trey Parker and Matt Stone, spoke about their dislike of conspiracy theories in the episode
commentary.217 They consciously decided that rather than rationally debunk conspiracy theories,
as has been done before, they would lower them to a lewd and childish level.218 There is no doubt
that the mode of expression could be described as offensive, but insisting that South Park and its
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creator’s express their viewpoint in a non-offensive way would deprive them of a powerful tool
for expressing their viewpoint.
Regulating the mode of expression inevitably affects viewpoint. Swearing can be a
powerful tool for politicians, and toilet humor can be a powerful tool for expressing viewpoints
and opinions. Justice Sotomayor stated in Iancu v. Brunetti that “[r]estrictions on particular modes
of expression do not inherently qualify as viewpoint discrimination; they are not by nature
examples of the government target[ing] . . . particular views taken by speakers on a subject.” 219
This statement rests on two key assumptions: (1) that modes of expression are separable from
viewpoint and (2) that the modes of expression in question, namely obscenity, vulgarity and
profanity, as defined by Justice Sotomayor, do not express a viewpoint. As to the first assumption,
whether in the context of mass media or in the context of art, the mode or way of expressing a
message seems to be intertwined with the message or viewpoint itself.

As to the second

assumption, vulgarity and profanity are and can be used in various contexts in ways that enhance
and express the viewpoint.
VI.

Conclusion

Matal v. Tam and Iancu v. Brunetti presented a clash of First Amendment ideologies
between the Justices on the current Supreme Court. The key issue is one of viewpoint neutrality.
In Brunetti, the majority of the Court, namely Justices Kagan, Thomas, Ginsburg, Gorsuch, and
Kavanaugh, held that if a law regulates ideas that offend, then it is a viewpoint-based regulation.220
Justices Alito, Roberts, Breyer, and Sotomayor, in their various dissents and concurrences suggest
that regulating all offensive, vulgar, or profane speech is viewpoint neutral. According to them, a
law that regulates vulgar, profane, or obscene modes of expression does not regulate viewpoint
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because it does not take sides. It regulates evenhandedly, regardless of “particular” views on a
subject.221 These two views are at odds with each other and are explored in this Comment within
the context of the Lanham Act.
Justice Sotomayor argues in her dissent in Iancu v. Brunetti that by separating the “immoral
and scandalous” standard in the Lanham Act into two distinct standards, the word “scandalous”
could be defined to only regulate the mode of expressing a trademark rather than the viewpoint or
message of the applicant. Justice Sotomayor suggested defining “scandalous” to proscribe modes
of expression that are obscene, vulgar, and profane. Such a content-based but viewpoint-neutral
construction would allow the government to regulate a government program or a government
subsidy scheme. The immediate problem with Justice Sotomayor’s argument is that Supreme
Court precedent is unclear as to whether trademark registration constitutes a government program
or a government subsidy. Even if trademarks were a government subsidy or a government
program, the question remains whether regulating solely modes of expression is constitutionally
permissible and whether it would truly result in viewpoint neutrality.
First, there is a dearth of Supreme Court precedent addressing whether the mode of
expression is a distinct aspect of speech and, if so, how such an aspect ought to be treated by
regulators. Second, the available precedent shows that when the Court has addressed modes of
expression, it has done so in an inconsistent and inconclusive manner. After the Brunetti decision
Congress is left without guidance in the task of rewriting the Lanham Act. This Comment argues
that such a narrowing construction would not alleviate the First Amendment problems facing the
Lanham Act. More broadly, the mode of expression, while a distinct part of speech, cannot be
cleanly separated from the message or viewpoint of the speaker.
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As suggested by communication theory, even if modes of expression were cleanly
separable from viewpoint, regulating or prohibiting certain modes of expression would inevitably
affect viewpoint. Communication theory does not support Justice Sotomayor’s argument that
obscenity, vulgarity, and profanity can be redefined as viewpoint neutral modes of communication.
Profanity and vulgarity are chosen by the speaker to convey a specific message. For example, the
message in Picasso’s Guernica could be conveyed in various ways. Yet Guernica would not be
able to convey Picasso’s viewpoint as eloquently and accurately if Picasso were limited to only
certain colors or to only drawing animals, not human figures. Would Simon Tam’s band convey
the same message and viewpoint if they were not called The Slants? Would Erik Brunetti’s
streetwear brand convey the same ethos if it were not named FUCT? The vulgarity and profanity
of these names greatly contribute to the messages and viewpoints behind them. Ultimately, as
Justice Alito concluded in Matal, “giving offense is a viewpoint.”222
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